UAE Arms Shipments to Sudan: The Airbridge, the Weapons and the Human Cost

A drone identified at Wadi Seidna military base was 6.5m long and had a wingspan of 10m (image source)

The United Arab Emirates has been implicated in covert arms transfers to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) through a network of cargo flights and re-exported Chinese weaponry, a flow investigators say has fuelled atrocities on the ground. Abu Dhabi’s role is documented in a confidential United Nations expert report that tracked a pattern of military-linked cargo flights from Emirati airbases to Chad—a staging ground for weapons and materiel bound for Sudan—creating what investigators call a “regional air bridge” into the conflict zone. The flights, often using large transport aircraft, were routed to Chadian airfields close to the Sudanese border, where cargo could be moved overland into RSF-held territory.

Open-source investigators and regional reporters have since corroborated the UN findings, noting a surge in flights between Ras Al-Khaimah and Abu Dhabi and Chadian hubs such as Amdjarass and N’Djamena that appear designed to avoid scrutiny. Analysts say the pattern points to deliberate logistics planning: airlift to Chad, overland transfer, then distribution inside Sudan—a route that circumvents direct flights into Sudan and complicates enforcement of the UN arms embargo.

A photo posted on X by @SudanSena geolocated by the BBC to Port Sudan airport suggested a weapons shipment (image source)

Watchdog groups have pushed the probe further, linking Emirati-registered companies and business figures to recruitment networks and private security firms that supplied fighters and logistics to the RSF, including alleged recruitment of foreign mercenaries and the movement of personnel and equipment across borders. Corporate records and leaked documents reviewed by investigators show how private contractors and shell companies can mask the origin and destination of military cargo.

Human-rights investigators have also identified Chinese-manufactured weapons—including guided bombs and heavy howitzers—in RSF arsenals and traced their likely re-export through the UAE, a finding that suggests the Emirates acted as a transit and re-export hub for sophisticated systems in breach of the embargo. Amnesty International’s forensic analysis of battlefield imagery and weapons fragments concluded that some systems were almost certainly re-exported via the UAE and later used in attacks that killed civilians.

A PAX drones expert suggested this photo shows a Zajil 3 drone (image source)

For survivors and aid workers the logistics debate is not abstract. A displaced teacher in North Darfur described convoys arriving with new weaponry and drones that changed the character of attacks, making bombardment more precise and deadly; aid agencies report that the arrival of heavier systems has coincided with escalations in civilian casualties and mass displacement. These field accounts underscore how supply chains translate directly into lives lost and communities uprooted.

U.S. and Western intelligence reporting has echoed these concerns, noting an uptick in materiel—including drones and heavy weapons—flowing to the RSF in recent months and prompting calls in some capitals to reassess military cooperation with the UAE. The accumulation of UN, NGO and intelligence findings raises urgent questions for policymakers: will Emirati authorities open transparent audits of cargo manifests and corporate registrations, and will international bodies follow the financial and logistical trails to hold intermediaries to account?

“Stopping the planes is only the start; the real test is whether states will follow the money and the paperwork,” one sanctions expert told investigators.